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The idea for this mini-conference surfaced in a conversation with Professor Rebecca S. Rudnick,1 who was working at the time on a tax bill for
a developing country. Both of us have been involved in attempts of
developing countries to move from a government, centrally-planned
economy to a private-sector, market economy. Of course, neither the
division between government and private sector, nor the division
* Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law. I am indebted to Professor
Ingo Vogelsang, Boston University, for his guidance and ideas concerning this
Foreward and to my research assistant Elizabeth L. Heick for her thorough research
and dedicated help.
1 Professor Rebecca S. Rudnick was a visiting Professor at Boston University
during the 1994-1995 academic year. Professor Frankel is referring to A Recipe for
Effecting Institutional Changes to Achieve Privatization, an Interdisciplinary MiniConference held at Boston University School of Law on April 26, 1995.
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between centrally-planned economy and market economy is clear cut, but
rather is a matter of degree. Further, privatization may be followed or
accompanied by government regulation; we have numerous forms of economic interaction that contain some features of both.
Depending on the context, the term privatization has many meanings.
Narrowly defined, privatization means the sale of a formerly governmentoperated enterprise, such as a telephone company or a national airline, to
the private sector.2 A broader definition includes a systemic change,
which differs with the economy of the country. In the United States,
where the economy is already situated towards the purely capitalist end
of the spectrum, privatization may mean implementing a voucher system
so that consumers may obtain an important public good, such as education from a private organization. In countries, such as China, whose
economies were until recently centrally-planned, privatization involves a
complete systemic overhaul, moving from government control to private
control in innumerable institutions. These examples demonstrate that the
movement to privatize is not confined to a particular group of nations,
developing countries, for example, but has also taken hold in Western
Europe and the United States. Here, the move is from government activities to private sector activities, and within the private sector, from
planned economic activities to market, or market-like activities. In short,
the privatization movement is global; it is not merely topical and important today, but will occupy us for some time to come. The importance
and breadth of the subject makes it worthy of study. The more we engage
in study and discussion the better. Hence, the impetus for organizing this
mini-conference.
Of the many questions raised by privatization, this mini-conference will
focus on the "how" in different countries: developed and developing,
Western countries and the Eastern bloc (including China), emphasizing
methodology and cultural traits. Clearly, the "how" will differ in fundamental aspects depending on the political and economic conditions of
countries in which the process is taking place.
The focus on the "how," however, does not mean that we will not consider other important questions that the movement to privatize raises.
The papers presented in this mini-conference reflect a wide range of
questions and this forward offers a background for the more detailed discussions that follow.
I. WHY

DID THE

MOVEMENT

TO PRIVATIZE ARISE RECENTLY?

The answer to this question is complex. In some respects, the answer
depends on the particular country, for example, whether it is developed
or developing. In other respects the answer is general and applicable to
2

Ronald A. Cass, The Optimal Pace of Privatization,13 B.U. INT'L L.J. 413 (1995).
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all countries. The reasons for privatization are not just economic and
social, but may include fiscal political pressure on the government.
One example of political pressure is the current lending policy of organizations such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.'
These organizations often condition their economic aid upon the implementation of a privatization plan, and exert great pressure on developing
countries to privatize. Another form of social and political pressure is the
tendency to "jump on the bandwagon" of privatization. Governments
may be strongly influenced by success stories of privatization in other
countries and find that reason enough to privatize their economies.
The current worldwide pressure on government treasuries provides
another very powerful incentive to privatize. 4 Many Latin American
countries have been motivated to privatize because of crushing government debt.5 However, privatization does not necessarily lead to economically sound results. Governments may launch a movement to privatize
before they have conducted a complete analysis of its costs and benefits.
Further, strong fiscal concerns could overshadow and undermine the
underlying goal of privatization - to increase public welfare. For example, the government may receive a much higher price by selling a public
enterprise as an intact monopoly, although the responsible choice for the
benefit of all sectors of the economy would be to break up the monopoly
before sale.6 In contrast, privatization may be propelled by sound economic reasons that overcome political and social pressures. Where public
resources are scarce, governments may choose to privatize in order to
divert scarce resources from uses of low priority to uses of higher priority.
For example, while a national airline may bring some measure of prestige
to a country, health, nutrition, and basic infrastructure are more important. Thus, privatizing can lead governments to shift resources from a
national airline to maintaining a working transportation system.7
Increasing the operating efficiency of companies currently managed by
government institutions is another economic motive to privatize. Arguably, enterprises can operate more efficiently under private management
than under government management. First, government enterprises cannot provide an inexpensive signaling device to determine the proficiency
of their performance. Government performance cannot be measured by
3

Rafael A. Porrata-Doria, Jr., Privatizationof PublicEnterprisesin Latin America,

1993 AM. Soc. INT'L L. 124, 125.
4 Mary M. Shirley, The What, Why, and How of Privatization:A World Bank
Perspective, 60 FoRDAHvm L. Rnv. S23, S23 (1992).

5 Porrata-Doria, supra note 3, at 124.
6 In Mexico, the government, seeking to privatize the telecommunications
company Telmex, chose not to break the monopolistic company up, apparently
because of the revenue motive. Pankaj Tandon, Welfare Effects of Privatization:Some
Evidence From Mexico, 13 B.U. INT'L LJ. 329 (1995).
7 Shirley, supra note 4, at S25.
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money (profitability), which is a more precise measure and less costly to
use than other measures. In contrast, the performance of actors in the
private sector, can be measured by profitability to the equity owners (the
shareholders). Even though profitability may not be the perfect measure
of efficiency, depending on the definition of efficiency, profitability measured in money terms is closely related to efficiency and is a less costly
signal than non-quantifiable measures. Similarly, the managerial effectiveness of the government cannot be measured against that of other
competing firms.' Absent a proper indicator, measuring government performance is far more costly than measuring the performance of market
actors.
Second, as compared to the private sector, the government operates
under political and bureaucratic pressures. While the central goal of a
private sector firm is profit maximization, the government necessarily
commits to other goals, such as public relations and re-distribution of
wealth.' For example, government officials may keep an obsolete firm in
business in order to keep its citizens employed. Whereas competition
drives private sector organizations to reorganize and downsize in
response to market and technological changes, government organizations
are less affected by such forces to efficiently reorganize; they may even be
driven to inefficiencies by counter-pressures. Public opinion and lobbying groups can exert strong political influence to keep a certain inefficient
operation in place for their own benefit.
When traumatic experiences occur that shakeup large organizations,
both "rejuvenated" government and the private sector can work well.
However, with time, as the influence of special interest groups increases,
it becomes harder to introduce any changes into government organizations.1" Firms exposed to market pressures experience less difficulty
adjusting and changing. 1
In a few limited situations a government may be in a better position to
operate a firm than the private sector. These are the situations involving
the creation of public goods. The primary economic justification for the
creation of public goods is to correct some perceived market failure. Certain types of enterprises, such as telephone or utility companies, are seen
as "natural monopolies," which will operate to take advantage of consumers in absence of government regulation. However, technology and
financing have enabled the private sector to create competing entities
where monopolies, such as utilities, postal and telephone service, reigned
8 Ingo Vogelsang, Micro-Economic Effects of Privatizing Telecommunications
Enterprises, 13 B.U. ITr'L LJ. 313 (1995).

9 Id
10

Note the difficulties of eliminating any subsidies and entitlements even after the

rationales for providing such subsidies have disappeared.
11 For arguments to the contrary, see discussion infra part II.

1995]

FOREWORD

before.' With the elimination of these monopolies one of the justifications for government management (or strict interventionist regulation)
no longer exists.
Third, an important impetus for privatization may be to provide incentives for innovation and investment, both of which are risky activities that
benefit society. Experience has shown that privatization increases the
rate of technological advancements, growth, and investments in an industry. In an analysis of the improved economic and welfare benefits that
have resulted from the privatization of British Telecom, one of our discussants, Professor Ingo Vogelsang, shows that not only has the operating
efficiency of British Telecom increased through more accurate pricing of
services and the elimination of redundant personnel, but that the rate of
investment in Telecom has also increased drastically.'" Such increases in
growth and investment are occurring in other countries as well. In Chile,
during the three years since the Chilean telephone company was privatized, the number of phone lines has increased by 72%. 1 In Mexico,
since the Aeromexico and Mexicana airlines were privatized, their capacity rapidly increased in both the number of destinations served and the
frequency of flights.' 5 In the analysis of British Telecom's privatization,
Professor Ingo Vogelsang demonstrates that the British telecommunications industry has experienced increased competition from new entrants
in the markets and that drastically increased new investment by British
Telecom. These cases illustrate the dynamic changes in investment and
growth triggered by the privatization of government enterprises.
Arguably, government stifles such incentives. In fact, bureaucracy provides disincentives to the risk-taking necessary for growth and investment. Further, because bureaucracy is often more focused on pressing
social matters, it is reluctant to finance new investments in a timely manner. Also, absent competition there is little pressure on the bureaucracy
to enhance technological advances, and growth.1 6
II.

THE CYCLE: PRIVATIZED MARKETS AND CENTRALIZED
PLANNING ORGANIZATIONS

Commentators have recognized that the movement toward privatization may be cyclical; that is, governments may oscillate between a strong
12

Vogelsang, supra note 8.

13 Id.
14 See

Shirley, supra note 4.

15 Tandon, supra note 6.

Of course, some critics may argue that government provides the seed money for
basic research either directly (through universities) or for government purposes (e.g.
through the defense department), and then shares the research with the private
sector. Therefore, in many cases the private sector avoids investment in risky basic
research and invests in technology only after the basic research has been done and
proven successful.
16
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role in planning the economy and a laissez-faire approach depending
upon the political, cultural, and economic climate.17 Such oscillations may
be discerned in Latin America and Southeast Asia, where, over the past
century, the governments have supported alternatively movements of
privatization and nationalization. Such oscillation is also evidenced in the
United States where, in the 1930's, the movement was towards centralized planning and management of economic resources by the government
and by large, private sector corporations. Today the movement has
reversed.
There are many explanations for the cyclical phenomenon of privatization/nationalization. Some explanations are based on politics or culture
- for example, that these cycles are triggered by cataclysmic events such
as the Great Depression or the breakdown of the Soviet Union. Cycles
may also reverse under the pressure of political movements, such as
intense nationalism, directed both externally or internally. Privatization
traditionally leads to an influx of foreign investment; it has the potential
to create a dual economy, where foreigners reap most of the benefits of
privatization, or at least appear to do so. A backlash of nationalization
may be a xenophobic response to the infusion of foreigners into the economy. Political jockeying between different ethnic groups within a country
in order to assert their ethnic and national character may also be a factor
in rising nationalism and the associated drive to nationalize enterprises.'"
Another explanation of the cycle is based on Marxist political economy,
suggesting that, during periods of free enterprise, wealth may concentrate
in the hands of a small number of affluent people while the standard of
living for the majority of the population decreases. This leads to a popular movement to nationalize the economy. After such a period, when the
ideals of nationalization fail to materialize, governments may return control to the private sector to increase productivity. Whatever the reasons
for the cycles, they have a significant effect on the national and world
economy. The cycles are costly because they force national economies
and government bureaucracies to reorganize.
It should be noted that a centralized-planned economy is not synonymous with a government-planned economy. The private sector includes
large, especially multinational, corporations, that are centrally managed.
Economies based on such large private enterprises and government-run
enterprises contrast with market economies composed of small
enterprises.
At first glance, it seems that centralization and privatization are motivated by the opposite political and economic reasons growing out of different conditions and, consequently, different power structures.
17 Amy L. Chua, The Privatization-NationalizationCycle: The Link Between
Markets and Ethnicity in Developing Countries, 95 COLuM. L. REv. 223, 225-26
(1995).
Is I at 226.
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Nonetheless, movements toward centralization and decentralization may
converge within a given economy. Take, for example the case of the
modem multi-national corporation. There is substantial literature that
explains why corporations have come into being and continue to exist.
Explanations include the high transaction costs associated with market
activities. Corporations serve to ensure orderly supplies necessary for
orderly and standardized production. 9 Therefore, both in the private
and the public sector, the movement toward privatization (markets) can
be accompanied by a simultaneous movement toward its opposite: central planning. While we do not currently see a strong movement toward
central planning in government, we do see a convergence towards mammoth, private sector, multi-national organizations that can be viewed as
semi-governments. Nowhere is that movement more manifest than in the
areas of new technology such as communications and computers. It is
significant that these newly-formed, large organizations are still sufficiently flexible to reorganize in response to changing environments.
Until the special interest groups within these organizations, or even
outside them, coalesce and strengthen, the organizations will probably
grow. Thereafter, we might see a break down of the centralized structure
and the development of a market either within a very loose organization
or within large markets.
In contrast to a cyclical movement, privatization may also be regarded
as an inevitable progression in society, "the culmination of a world-historical learning process."2 Some people may believe or hope that the functions of the government can be performed by the private sector, and that
government may eventually become unnecessary and disappear. Most of
us realize that the private sector cannot do it all. The question is: under
what circumstances does the pendulum swing toward government management of economic resources, or at least toward substantial government intervention in the management of economic resources? I believe
that whether the government will play an increasing role in managing
economic resources may depend on the extent to which the markets will
meet the demands of the population in terms of services, safety, quality of
life, and prices. If far away localities do not have post office facilities, the
government is likely to interfere. If products contain serious hidden risks,
or monopolies arise, the government will interfere. If disparity among
various classes of the population becomes too great for the acceptable
mores of society, the government will interfere. When people become
E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM: FIRMS,
MARKETS, RELATIONAL CONTRACTING 295 (1985); OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON,
MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS 1-2 (1975);
Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937). See also
Professor Manuel A. Utset's paper presented in this mini-conference, Markets in the
Age of MechanicalReproduction, 13 B.U. INT'L LJ.351 (1995).
20 Chua, supra note 17, at 225.
19 OLIVER
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disillusioned with private sector and market solutions they will turn to the
government.
III.

WHAT ARE THE PRE-EXISTING CONDITIONS NECESSARY FOR

EFFECTIVE PRIVATIZATION?

There is no consensus on how privatization should be effected, but
there is a general consensus as to the preexisting conditions necessary for
privatization to succeed.
A.

Cost/Benefit Analysis

Any government considering privatization of a state-owned enterprise
or industry should perform a cost/benefit analysis to determine whether
private enterprise is the most efficient mechanism for such enterprise or
industry. That is, the government must compare the public welfare under
continued government operation and welfare under private operation to
determine whether divestiture should take place.21
B.

PoliticalStability

Assuming that privatization will optimize welfare, the government
must establish an environment conducive to privatization. Such an environment requires, first and foremost, political stability. For many developed countries seeking to privatize, stability may not be an issue, but in
former Soviet bloc countries and other developing nations, the crucial
condition of political stability is problematic. Another condition is the
recognition of the "rule of law." The "rule of law" is necessary to offer
predictability to market actors and enhance their ability to plan and
enforce their agreements.
C. Free Flow of Information and Capital"'
Free flow of information is necessary to promote privatization. So, too,
is the free flow of capital to finance the privatization process, especially
capital from foreign investors.
21

For an economic analysis of how to conduct this cost/benefit examination, see

LEROY

P.

JONES

ET AL.,

SELLING

PUBLIC

ENTERPRISES:

A

COST

BENEFIT

METHODOLOGY 16 (1990). See also M.E. Beesley & S.C. Littlechild, Privatization:

Principles, Problems, and Priorities, in PRIVATIZATION,
DEREGULATION

REGULATION,

AND

23, 30 (1992).

2 Unfortunately information regarding enterprises in former communist countries
is often lacking.
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D.

Banking System

The proper functioning of the emerging market economy requires the
establishment and maintenance of a strong, private banking system.23
E. The Formulation of the Body of Business Law Necessary to
Support a Market Economy'
Business law includes a number of areas, and property rights are the
fundamental starting point of such a legal framework, and must include
rights regarding real property, movable property, and most importantly in
the modem era, intellectual property. Next in the genesis of this fundamental legal system is the establishment of contract law. The effective
enforcement of agreements is one of the most important determinants of
the performance of a market economy. 25 Laws ensuring the maintenance
of fair competition (e.g., antitrust laws) are also crucial.26 It is further
necessary to establish a method for allowing firms to exit the market
because some businesses will inevitably fail, and there must be some
means to balance the competing rights of creditors, the firm's employees,
and the firm's shareholders. Absent a bankruptcy system, creditors and
employees will rush to the debtor firm's assets and, inevitably, the resulting disorderly process will be unfair to all parties. Furthermore, without
such a system in place, creditors will operate in an uncertain environment. Without a reliable means of predicting the consequences of insolvency, they will not be able to accurately determine the terms of the
credit agreement, such as interest rates and repayment schedules. 7
F. Policies
In addition to laws, governments must follow certain policies. For
example, competition policy must be the focal point for post-communist
2

On the current weaknesses of the banking systems in the newly privatized

economies in Eastern Europe see ROMAN FRYDMAN & ANDRZEJ

RAPACZYNSKI,
PRIVATIZATION IN EASTERN EuRoPE: Is THE STATE WITHERING AWAY? 84-85, 128-

34 (1994).
24 See generally Tamar Frankel, The Legal Infrastructureof Markets: The Role of
Contract and Property Law, 73 B.U. L. REV. 389 (1993).
25 Paul H. Rubin, Growing a Legal System in the Post-Communist Economies, 27
CORNELL INT'L L.J. 1, 3 (1994). These conditions are not yet fully met in the former
centrally-planned economies.
26 See Michele Balfour & Cameron Crise, A Privatization Test: The Czech

Republic, Slovakia, and Poland, 17 FORDHAM INT'L LJ. 84, 89-90, 99-102, 118-20
(1993).
27 Evan D. Flaschen & Timothy B. DeSieno, The Development of Insolvency Law

as Part of the Transitionfrom a Centrally Planned to a Market Economy, 26 INT'L
LAW. 667, 668-69 (1992).
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countries in their transition to a market economy.' As Professor Pankaj
Tandon argues, without robust competition the benefits of privatization
may never be realized. 9 The fact that private sector operations are less
expensive than operations in the public sector may largely be explained
by the higher degree of competition that actors face in the private sector.
That is why a public enterprise operated as a competitive commercial
enterprise may perform just as effectively as a private sector enterprise,
and a private enterprise in monopolistic market, without the pressure of
competition, is likely to perform just as poorly as one run by the government. In his presentation, Professor Tandon focuses on the privatization
of airline and telecommunication companies in Mexico to illustrate the
significance of competition policy.30 The privatization of Aeromexico
and Mexicana, with a focus on competition policy during divestiture, has
benefitted consumers greatly due to the increased capacity of the airlines
and a significant drop in prices. 3 On the other hand, the primary focus of
the divestiture of Telmex was to generate revenues for the government,
not to enhance the competitiveness and performance of the telecommunications industry.3 2 The government supported the monopolistic position
of Telmex and benefitted greatly from the price increases for telephone
33
services but the consumers ended the losers.
Another policy that is conducive to privatization is the establishment of
investment funds.34 These funds are believed to play a pivotal role in the
success or failure of a privatization program. As watchdogs over the
managements of the companies in which the funds invest, they are
expected to protect the funds' investors. Because the funds can diversify
their portfolios, they can reduce the issuer risks for individual investors.
Fund managers have more financial clout than individual investors and
they have more access to financial resources, and particular access to
28 Competition policy takes on an even greater significance because such laws
should be implemented before a country may join the European Economic
Community. Eastern European countries with formerly centrally-planned economies
are now modeling their competition laws on those of the European Community, in
the hope of someday securing membership. See Carolyn Brzezinski, Competition and

Antitrust Law in Central Europe: Poland, The Czech Republic, Slovakia, and

Hungary, 15 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1129, 1133, 1141, 1149-52 (1994). Competition law
should include a methodology for controlling mergers, preventing the abuses of
market dominance and monopolistic practices, breaking up monopolies, and
removing tariff and other non-tariff barriers to foreign trade.
2 Tandon, supra note 6.
30 Id.

31 Id
32 Id
33 I d

31 Richard K. Gordon, Privatization and Legal Development, 13 B.U. INT'. L.J.

367 (1995).
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international contacts.35 However, the funds pose serious problems,
including fraud, insider trading, ineffective or irresponsible management,
and potential opportunities for these managements to exert monopolistic
pressures.3 6 Therefore, laws must be enacted to regulate fund managements, structures of investment funds, and nascent stock markets to prevent or reduce these problems while at the same time maximizing the
benefits they offer in newly privatized economies.37 Thus, in theory funds
facilitate privatization. In practice they may fail to perform the task.
IV. How

SHOULD THE LEGAL INFRASTRUCrURE BE DESIGNED?

No doubt, creating the needed legal framework raises difficult questions. Where shall the laws come from? Should laws be established
through the common law process or through codification? The temptation to make a wholesale transfer of a code from a developed capitalist
economy to economies in transition must be resisted. Although such a
legal transplant may be expedient, it is not likely to address the needs of
each society and its historical, cultural, and political development. As a
result, it will most likely fail to take roots.
From my experience in advising Chinese officials on the drafting of
China's Banking Law in 1992, 1 conclude that a transfer of a specific rule,
which is necessarily tied to the environment in which the rule arose, is
less appropriate in the context of privatization than the transfer of general models including concepts, standards, and legal techniques that can
be used in numerous rules.3 8 However, even general models may not be
readily transferable. Certain legal models, for example, mortgages and
liens, used in the United States and the Western World to resolve particular problems - security for creditors - are useless to the Chinese in
solving similar problem because, in China, land and many inventories of
failing enterprises have no markets. Yet, other models, such as disclosure, were extremely useful to the Chinese in resolving problems in
entirely different contexts.
35 Matthew J. Hagopian, The Engines of Privatization:Investment Funds and Fund
L. & Bus. 75, 75, 81-83 (1994).
See also William C. Philbrick, The Task of Regulating Investment Funds in the
Formerly Centrally Planned Economies, 8 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 539, 541-42 (1994);
Andrew Xuefeng Qian, Riding Two Horses: Corporatizing Enterprises and the
Emerging Securities Regulatory Regime in China, 12 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 62, 63
Legislation in PrivatizingEconomies, 15 Nw. J. INT'L

(1993).

36 See generally J. Robert Brown, Jr., Order from Disorder: The Development of

the Russian Securities Markets, 15 U. PA. J. INT'L Bus. L. 509 (1995) (examining the
abuses that have taken place in the Russian securities markets, including problems of
advertisements which greatly exaggerated the potential returns of investment funds).
37 Balfour & Crise, supra note 26, at 90-93.
38 Tamar Frankel, Knowledge Transfer: Suggestions for Developing Countries on

the Receiving End, 13 B.U. INT'L L. 141 (1995).
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Therefore, rather than provide the Chinese with our rules, we engaged
in a three-pronged method of analysis. We identified problems that
China faced; we proceeded to examine the reasons for these problems,
and whether the reasons were similar to those in other countries. At the
next stage, we attempted to find solutions to problems in China through
numerous models taken from related and unrelated areas of the law in
the United States and other countries. Many times, I jumped to the conclusion that the United States could offer China ready-made, off-the-shelf
solutions in the forms of statutes and regulations. Each time, I found that
the process of forming a legal framework for privatization is a much more
complex undertaking. The final step in the process of implementing
privatization is the enactment of specific regulations which authorize and
define the process. Although these regulations vary greatly from country
to country, some fundamental requirements apply to all: the process
must be fair, widely publicized, and streamlined (within one government
agency) without sacrificing the underlying goal of increasing public welfare. Thus, the analysis and form of privatization is country specific.
France or Great Britain may accomplish privatization through large scale
sales or auctions of publicly owned enterprises but this form will probably
be inappropriate for one of the former communist countries. 9 Furthermore, any plan must solve the problems intrinsic to that country's social
and cultural environment.
V. How

SHOULD STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES BE VALUED AND
PREPARED FOR SALE?

One significant problem with which many countries attempting to
privatize grapple is valuation. How do we value an enterprise that has
until now existed outside of the market? Valuation of such an enterprise
can be a very subjective, arbitrary process, which may undermine a privatization program.' How to prepare the state-owned enterprise for sale is
another potential problem. The enterprise must be significantly restructured before privatization. For example, the East German privatization
agency, the Treuhandanstalt, is required by law to break up most stateowned enterprises into separate companies to prevent the transfer of
large monopolies to the private sector. 4 1 Further, sequencing of the
privatization stages poses difficult questions. Which firms should be
39 To design the proper method, we should inquire as to who will receive
ownership rights under the privatization scheme and how ownership rights will be
distributed, directly or through some indirect form such as a share in an investment
fund. See FRYDMAN & RAPACZYNSKI, supra note 23.
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privatized first? Often, the most inefficient firms should be privatized
first, but this raises the question of which nationalized firms are the most
inefficient.
VI.

AT WHAT PACE SHOULD PRIVATIZATION BE INTRODUCED?

Another important question relating to privatization is whether to
implement privatization at a gradual rate or by drastic measures designed
to have a strong immediate impact. 2 Those who opt for a gradual
removal of government control seek small, incremental changes, over a
longer period, thus prolonging the social and economic "pain" but at a
lower level. This method may avoid the social upheavals of the drastic
change, and produce a more stable transition. Those who would "rip"

away government control propose a high level of "pain," but for a relatively short period. Under this more revolutionary view, unless changes
occur in a "big bang," the existing system of nationalization may become
even more entrenched or, in the alternative, the population may become
dissatisfied with visible results from the privatization program and
reverse the process.
This mini-conference reflects the controversy. Dean Ronald A. Cass
argues that the optimal pace of privatization may differ according to the
social, cultural, and institutional background of the country effecting the
change, but that in the long-run it is better to err on the side of a fastpaced change rather than perpetuating the existing economic inefficiency.4" Professor Robert B. Seidman posits that the relevant issue may
not be a choice between "big-bang" or gradualist theories, because both
forms of transition have resulted in a great deal of "pain" for the population.4 Instead the focus should be on the decision-making process, and
the legal and economic theories underlying the form of the transition to a
market economy. He argues that, thus far, these theories have been relatively divorced from the social and institutional framework. In his opinion, economic and legal theory should be tied to an understanding of the
functioning of the country's institutions.
Regardless of the merits of the big-bang and gradualist theories, a big
bang reform strategy has been very difficult to implement in practice.
Professor Richard K. Gordon reminds us that establishing the fundamental framework of business law may sound theoretically simple, but in reality is a daunting task.45 The lawyer attempting to arrive at the proper
policy choices underlying such law is confronted by a wide array of legal
ECONOMICS 3, 3-15 (Gregory S. Alexander & Grazyna Sk~pska eds., 1994)
[hereinafter A FouRTH WAY].

42 Cass, supra note 2; Gordon, supra note 34; Robert B. Seidman et al., Big Bangs
and Decision-Making: What Went Wrong?, 13 B.U. INT'L L.J. 435 (1995).

43 Cass, supra note 2.
44 Seidman, supra note 42.
45 Gordon, supra note 34.
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options borrowed from other capitalist countries, all of which may be viable solutions, or all of which may be totally inappropriate in the social
and cultural climate of that country. The lawyer must determine what
rules should apply in privatizing countries - the legal "software - and
examine methods for enforcing these rules (either through administrative
agencies or courts), that is, the legal "hardware. ' '4 6 These difficulties
explain why a big bang theory of privatization reform has been hard to
implement in former centrally-planned economies.
Clearly, the question of how to implement privatization involves farreaching implications and should be approached differently depending
upon the country. Developed countries that are not as concerned with
the fundamental overhaul of their economy may focus only on the privatization of a specific industry; they may search for the Pareto optimal
level of privatization or for the proper legal methodology of selling public
enterprises to the private sector.
Former centrally-planned economies and developing countries are
more likely to focus on the problems of creating an environment conducive to privatization, formulating a fundamental legal framework including property, contract, competition, bankruptcy, and securities laws, and
the appropriate pace of the change.
Mr. Harvey E. Bines, Partner at Sullivan and Worcester, surveys the
methods used by the governments of a number of these economiesPoland, Hungary, and the Czech and Slovak Republic - to effect the
transformation from a centrally-planned to a market economy. 47 Mr.
Bines examines specific legal constructs in these countries, including the
format of contracts, the legal rights of creditors, and the protection of
stockholders." He also focuses on the area of strategic and financial
investment, including the problem areas of employee participation in
investment, management of risk, and sources of financing.49
VII.

POST PRIVATIZATION: WHAT WILL BE THE CONTINUING ROLE

OF GOVERNMENT IN THE ECONOMY?
An important policy decision concerning privatization relates to the
role of the government in the economy after enterprises have been privatized. Under a system of nationalization, government's role as producer
of public goods was merged with its role as owner of enterprises, and in
centrally-planned economies, as owner of all the means of production.
46
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Frequently, the government's role as benefactor of the public was overshadowed by its economic role. In Poland, the government devoted
extensive natural resources to state-owned industries, depleting Poland's
natural resources and harming the environment. 50 Under privatization,
the government may focus on protecting the public good, for example,
with efforts to protect natural resources.
After implementing privatization, the government should play an
active role in two major areas. First, government should continue to
monitor and regulate divestiture techniques and measure the overall success of the privatization program. The government should enforce the
newly-created legal framework in areas such as private property rights,
contract rights, bankruptcy, prohibition of monopolies, and the regulation
of investment funds. The need for monitoring and enforcement is illustrated in Professor Karla Simon's examination of the methodologies of
privatizing the social and cultural sectors of an economy, for example,
health care and museums. 5 ' Professor Simon discusses the experience of
Central and Eastern Europe and the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union, where the usual method of accomplishing privatization
is by transferring state assets to a newly formed not-for-profit organization.5" After such a transfer, it is vital that the public interest be protected and that the potential for corruption be curbed. In Romania, the
new government privatized forty county youth organizations by transferring their assets to newly formed foundations.5 3 With no monitoring,
the
54
potential for mismanagement became a reality within a year. Most of
the physical assets and much of the cash of the foundations had disappeared, and the playgrounds of the youth organizations were destroyed. 55
The government's monitoring role is especially important with respect to
the privatization of social and cultural enterprises. Professor Simon
argues that in order to monitor effectively the government must define
the public interest, and select the regulations or legal institutions appropriate to safeguard the public interest in these social and cultural institutions, and - most importantly - establish56 mechanisms for enforcing
these laws to prevent abuse and corruption.
Second, the government should help reduce macro-economic changes
that have a negative impact on society. Whether the privatization process
5o Stanislaw Biernat, The Uneasy Breach with Socialized Ownership: Legal Aspects
of Privatizationof State-Owned Enterprises in Poland, in A FOURTH WAY, supranote
41, at 19, 26.
s' Karla W. Simon, Privatization of Social and Cultural Services in Central and
Eastern Europe: Comparative Experiences, 13 B.U. IT'L L.J. 383 (1995).
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is gradual or revolutionary, some degree of transitional problems in society will occur due to macro-economic changes, such as inflation and
declining real incomes.57 One of the most pressing problems for a centrally-planned society undertaking such a transition will be the high rate
of structural unemployment. The distribution of this "pain" is not governed by economic theory but by the response of social and political institutions. In Poland, for example, the impact of unemployment was
cushioned by income-replacement for dislocated workers. Such safety
nets are necessary to ease the pain of the sweeping changes in a privatizing economy.58
After privatizing the economy, governments will be faced with a new
issue: taxation.5 9 When governments manage most enterprises in the
economy, they draw on the profits of the enterprises, as any owner would,
to support their operations. In those public-sector dominated economies,
taxation is far less important than in economies in which the private sector owns the enterprises. In such economies governments need revenues
to provide public services, and taxes are the main source of their revenue.
Professor Rebecca S. Rudnick examines tax issues in the context of
privatization, providing a survey of the methods for taxing foreign investments in real property. Five basic taxes may be applicable to foreign
investment: income and capital gains taxes, property taxes, value-added
taxes, net wealth taxes, and transfer taxes such as inheritance taxes."0
Professor Richard K. Gordon specifically scrutinizes the tax implications of privatization by using pension funds."1 While the pension fund
method of privatization has several advantages, one of the primary questions raised by such a method is whether the pension funds should or
should not be tax exempt.62 Professor Gordon analyzes the taxation
issues of tax exempt pension funds and non-tax exemption pension funds
used to privatize the economy. 63
The question of the continuing role of government in society is especially critical for former centrally-planned economies. Will the Central
and Eastern European economies transform themselves into capitalist
economies with little government intervention, along the lines of the
57 RAMANADHAM,

supra note 40.

58 Jackie Ruff, Job Security in Poland: Economic Privatization Policy and
Workplace Protections,7 TEMP. IN"L & COMP. LJ.1, 10-14 (1993).
59 One of the most important tax issues that former centrally-planned economies

will face is how to tax without absorbing funds necessary to fuel investment in the new
market economies. One answer may be a consumption tax, such as a value-added tax,
which will increase the savings rate rather than absorb the savings available for
investment. See FR.YDMAN & RAPACZYNSKi, supra note 23.
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Western world, or will they metamorphose into a new and original economic system with a level of government intervention somewhere in
between capitalism and communism? The answers to these questions
remain to be seen.

